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Our purpose is to examine a firm's optimal output decision and valuation when its shareholders 
hold a limited number of risky assets. The primary theoretical result indicates that the market- 
to-book ratio is a function of the degree of shareholder diversification. Our theory suggests a 
negative relationship between a firm's market-to-book ratio and shareholder diversification. 
(MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO; ANTIDIVERSIFICATION; MAYSHAR CAPM) 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between valuation and microeconomic structure under conditions 
of uncertainty is a contemporary concern. Many articles have appeared recently that link 
valuation, in the context of the standard capital asset pricing model of Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966), to a firm's product and factor markets. The most 
noteworthy to the following analysis are Booth (1981), Conine (1983), Greenberg et al. 
(1978), Harpaz-Thomadakis (1982), Hite (1977), Lin (1979), Long-Racette (1974), 
Subrahmanyam-Thomadakis (1980) and Thomadakis (1976). 
The purpose of this article is to examine a firm's output decision and market value to 
book value ratio when its shareholders hold a limited number of risky assets; that is, they 
hold a subset of the market portfolio. This relationship in this framework has not been 
examined previously, and it integrates financial valuation with the microeconomic struc- 
ture of a firm's optimal output decision in a partial equilibrium.' The impact of this 
limited diversification is examined in the framework of the capital asset pricing model, 
hereafter CAPM, as formulated by Mayshar (1979), (1981) . The microeconomic ana- 
logue of the Modigliani-Miller (1961) true growth model, resulting from market imper- 
fections, is developed in a world of limited shareholder diversification. 
The primary theoretical result indicates that the market to book ratio is a function of 
the degree of shareholder diversification, hereafter antidiversification. An intriguing im- 
plication of our model is a rationale for converting a public firm to a private firm, i.e. 
"taking a company private." As in many areas of finance, such as dividend policy, man- 
agement should be aware of its shareholder clientele. For example, in our model a few 
undiversified investors, ceteris paribus, would place a higher value on the firm than 
would many diversified investors. A suggestion is presented as to how management can 
determine easily the degree to which its shareholders are diversified. There are three 
pragmatic (and related) reasons for examining how antidiversification affects a firm's 
valuation. First, the observed behavior of individual investors demonstrates that the 
majority hold imperfectly diversified portfolios.2 The second reason is that, since the 
* Accepted by William T. Ziemba; received August 1985. This paper has been with the authors 13 months 
for 3 revisions. 
' For a concise survey of the financial determinants of systematic risk, see Bowman (1979). Subrahmanyam- 
Thomadakis (1980) derived the relationship between systematic risk and microeconomic variables such as 
Lerner's index of monopoly power (which is directly related to the reciprocal of the price elasticity of demand), 
and the labor-capital ratio of a firm. 
2 In the Wharton Survey of 1975 (Blume and Friend 1978), the median number of stocks held was found 
to be fewer than four, with 34 percent holding no more than two. Blume and Friend (1975) found that based 
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inception of testing the standard CAPM, researchers have often found that variance (in 
addition to beta) is a significant explanatory variable of returns.3 While all empirical tests 
do not agree, the evidence suggests that variance not be overlooked. Third, surveys have 
shown that the standard CAPM has gained a widespread acceptance for cost of capital 
estimation for both regulated and nonregulated firms. Considering the evidence of average 
investor stock holdings, results of empirical testing of the CAPM, and widespread ac- 
ceptance of the standard CAPM for cost of equity capital estimation, the question of an 
optimal output decision in a world of antidiversification is of more significance than 
simply theoretical argument. 
?2 provides a review of the Mayshar CAPM. In ?3 the theoretical relationship between 
valuation and antidiversification is developed. In ?4 we empirically examine the rela- 
tionship between market-to-book ratios and shareholder diversification. The final section 
concludes the analysis. 
2. Asset Pricing with Antidiversification 
The absence of transaction costs in the standard capital asset pricing model is often 
viewed as being a minor idealization. As Mayshar ( 1979), (1981 ) has shown, however, 
even with relatively small fixed transaction costs the risk premium of an asset will depend 
upon a weighted average of its covariance with the market and its own-variance.4 This 
result obtains because with transaction costs it is apparent that an investor may not trade 
in all risk assets. As a result, variance although diversifiable, can be relevant to the pricing 
of a risk asset. In the standard CAPM with no market frictions, all investors own the 
market portfolio and therefore are totally diversified. Variance plays no direct role in the 
valuation of a risk asset. Transaction costs in the Mayshar CAPM include not only 
brokers' fees and losses due to the bid-ask spread but also include various other obstacles 
to trade, such as nondivisibility of assets, shortsale restrictions, institutional restraints, 
and even the subjective costs of managing one's own portfolio. For a further discussion 
of the nature of transaction costs see Mayshar ( 1978). 
The weights, applied to both an assets covariance with the market and its own variance, 
are a function of the degree of diversification of the firm's shareholders. The implication 
on a sample of individual income tax returns from 1971 considering only dividend paying stocks, 35.15 percent 
of investors held only one stock, 50.51 percent of investors held no more than two, and 10.72 percent held ten 
or more stocks. Blume, Friend and Crockett (1974) in a study that included nondividend paying stocks found 
the median number of holdings of stock was two, while the average was 3.41. In both Blume and Friend (1975) 
and (1978) other measures of diversification were employed with the results confirming the conclusion that 
individual investors are, on average, highly undiversified. 
3In an early test, Douglas (1968) found residual variance to be a significant explanatory variable. Miller- 
Scholes (1972) also found residual variance to be a significant explanatory variable and concluded that skewness 
in the return generating process caused the observed association. In contrast, Fama and MacBeth (1973), using 
portfolio grouping procedures, found that coefficient of residual variance was not significantly different from 
zero. Roll (1977) argued that the grouping procedures reduced the skewness in return distributions and accounted 
for the difference between Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Miller-Scholes (1972). However, Friend, Westerfield 
and Granito (1978) discovered that with broader market indexes residual standard deviation was extremely 
significant in both individual asset and grouping tests, thus suggesting that return skewness may not be an 
adequate explanation. Levy (1979), in an analysis similar to Mayshar (1981), also found that variance was a 
very significant explanatory variable (even more so than beta). We recognize that even though tests use residual 
variance and variance, in theory they are not the same. That is, residual variance is that part of variance that 
is diversifiable. Lakonishok-Shapiro (1986) also examines the impact of variance in the return generating process. 
We acknowledge Roll's (1977) criticism which suggests that a valid test of the CAPM has not been made, 
and it is doubtful that a valid test can be made. 
4 A similar result has been shown by Levy (1979), and has been argued by Lintner (1978) and Tobin and 
Brainard (1977). 
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is that own-variance can affect significantly both the equilibrium rate of return and market 
valuation of an asset. 
The market value, Sj, formulation of the Mayshar ( 198 1) CAPM is given by5 
Sj= lI+R {E(CFj) -j[djcov (CFj,CF,,) +(1 -dj)oCFJ]} (1) 
where R is the risk free rate, E(CFj) is the expected cash flow of a firm j, Xj is the market 
price of risk, cov (CFj, CF,,,) is the covariance between the cash flow of firm j and market 
portfolio, o4cFj is the variance of the cash flow of firm j, and dj which is constrained to 
be bounded by zero and one represents the degree to which the shareholders of firm j 
are diversified. If dj equals one, all shareholders own the market portfolio and equation 
( 1 ) reduces to the standard CAPM. As the degree of antidiversification increases, dj 
approaches zero. When dj equals zero, asset j is the only risky asset held by each of the 
investors inj. Under this extreme form of antidiversification only own-variance matters. 
There is no reason for the market value of j to depend upon its covariance with other 
assets. 
A fundamental question in the implementation of the Mayshar CAPM is the estimation 
of the firm's dj. One can argue it is incumbent upon management to know who its 
shareholders are. This may not be feasible in very large publicly traded firms (except that 
management certainly has access to shareholder lists routinely compiled by the firm's 
Transfer Agent). A reasonable (downside) proxy can be the percentage of shares out- 
standing held by institutional investors (we assume that the vast majority of institutional 
investors, because of fiduciary responsibility, employ fairly diversified investment strat- 
egies).6 In Table 1 can be found data available from quarterly reports filed by institutions 
with the SEC (this covers investment advisers, banks, insurance companies and mutual 
funds). It is evident that substantial variation exists in the institutional ownership of 
common stock, even within an industry. Surveys also have shown that these types of 
companies use the standard CAPM in the estimation of their cost of equity capital. The 
average institutional ownership of all publicly traded companies in the U.S., at month- 
end June 1986, was 35.9 percent. While institutional investment concentration certainly 
changes over time, this evidence, linked with the aforementioned survey evidence of 
average individual investor stock holdings, results of empirical testing of the CAPM, and 
recognition that the standard CAPM has received widespread acceptance for cost of 
capital estimation, suggest that management should be aware of its shareholder clientele 
for its impact on decision-making. 
3. The Model 
In this section we derive a firm's market value to book value ratio in a world of 
antidiversification. The development is similar to Thomadakis ( 1976), Subrahmanyam- 
Thomadakis (1980), and Conine (1983). An all-equity firm in a taxless world is assumed. 
We first rewrite equation ( 1) as 
Sj( 1 + R) = E(CFj) - AjX{ dj4cFj+ dj cov* (CFj, CF,f) + (1 - dj)4CFj} (2) 
where cov* (CFj, CF,,) = cov (CFj, CF,, - CFj). 
S Our equation ( 1 ) is Mayshar's equation ( 17), the basic result of his paper. Mayshar's equation ( 17) is in 
a unit formulation; therefore, as he suggests ( 1981, p. 589), multiply both sides of his equation ( 17) by the 
number of units of the asset to arrive at the aggregate market value given by our equation ( 1). As discussed by 
Mayshar ( 1979), ( 1981 ) the assignment problem of which assets are held by a particular investor is exogenous, 
only the equilibrium values and rates of return are derived. In addition, see Mayshar ( 1978 ). 
6 As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the number of investors in an asset may not be synonymous with 
the degree of diversification of those investors. 
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TABLE 1 
Instituitional Ownership of Common Stock 
A Provy for dj 
Percentage of Common Stock 
Company held by Institutions 
International Business Machines 48.5 
General Electric 48.8 
Exxon Corporation 33.0 
General Motors Corporation 38.6 
Philip Morris, Inc. 60.6 
Eastman Kodak Company 46.1 
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing 60.9 
Atlantic Richfield Company 50.8 
Digital Equipment Corporation 86.4 
Standard Oil Company (Indiana) 35.3 
* The ten largest companies in the U.S. ranked by market value of institutional 
holdings as of month-end June 1986 as found in Barron's. 
Rearranging (2) and using an approximation so that the firm specific Xjdy can be 
replaced by X a market-wide parameter,7'8 we obtain 
S1( 1 + R) = E(CFj) - X[cov* (CFj, CFm) +f jlFJ] (3) 
where f = I/ dj. 
There are several ways uncertainty can enter the demand-price trade-off. We use the 
multiplicative demand function of Dhrymes ( 1964). It is given by (tildes denote random 
variables) 
pi = djQ"' where (4) 
Pj = price per unit sold of the jth firm, 
Qj = output of jth firm, 
X = the constant elasticity in absolute value (q > 1), and9'0 
aj = the random demand parameter assumed to follow a zero drift random walk. 
The realization of the demand parameter reflects changes in any of the factors in the 
determination of the demand-price trade-off. Examples are realizations of aggregate in- 
come, consumer preferences, and changes in the prices of substitutes and complements. 
These factors induce shifts in the demand-price trade-off rather than movement 
along it. 
We assume, as in Mayshar ( 1979), for mathematical tractability, that all investors exhibit identical cautiousness 
and have homogeneous expectations of cash flows (in Mayshar ( 1981 ) heterogeneity among investors with 
respect to expected cash flow was introduced). 
8 More specifically, the approximation depends upon the assumption that holders of different assets have no 
systematic differences in their degree of risk aversion. Mayshar ( 1981 ) discusses the ramifications of reformulating 
the model to this additional assumption. 
9 To show that constant elasticity is implied by the multiplicative demand function requires the simultaneous 
substitution of the first derivative of equation (4) with respect to demand, and equation (4) itself into the 
formulation for price elasticity of demand. A model with constant elasticity is utilized because ( 1 ) the majority 
of empirical studies have employed logarithmic regression, and (2) elasticity is not constant along linear demand- 
price relationship. 
0 The constant elasticity in absolute value is assumed to be greater than one to satisfy the second-order 
condition for maximization. This is consistent with Greenberg et al. ( 1978), Subrahmanyam-Thomadakis 
( 1980) and Thomadakis ( 1976). 
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The total revenue for the jth firm is then expressed as 
TRj = diQ ((5)/) 
where TRj is the total revenue. 
The variable cost per unit sold is denoted by Vj and for mathematical tractability is 
assumed constant. After optimal output is determined, sufficient capital is obtained at a 
cost of K per unit of output. The per unit liquidation value also is assumed to be K. 
Normatively, this liquidation value will represent a return of initial capital. The random 
end-of-period cash flow j then is given by 
Un0)/?7] -VjQj+KQ-. (6) 
Since the Mayshar CAPM is cast in a single period, the firm is assumed to invest 
sufficiently at the beginning of the period to produce the optimal output. At the end of 
the period the firm adjusts the price to clear the market. All trading is assumed to take 
place at the end of the period, when realization of total revenue, cost and liquidation 
value occurs. 
The optimal output will be the Qj which maximizes the net present value of the firm, 
S- KQj. We now express equation (3) in the context of the micro-economic variables 
by using equation (6), 
Sj( 1 + R) = E(aj)Q'(t 1)/n] + (K - Vj))Qj 
fC[2(?7-1)/n] - Q.. )/cov* (aj, CFm) +?fQj 0].2 (7) 
Before forming the net present value (NPV), we make a notational transformation. Let 
8 = i/(7 - 1) and Z = Q'1I. The NPV now equals Sj - KZ' so that 
NPV = (1/1 + R) {ZE(aj)- [Vj + KR]Z- X[Z cov * (aj, CF) +Z2f]}. (8) 
To maximize end of period market value requires determination of the optimal output 
that maximizes the net present value made at the beginning of the single period. Opti- 
mizing (8) with respect to Z we obtain 
E(aj) - X cov* (aj, CF,) - 2Xoa5fZ*j -[j + KR]Z*I-I = 0 or (9) 
E(a.) - X cov* (aj, CF,n1) - 2XajfZ* - j + KR]Z (10) 
and Z* represents optimal output. 
Equation (9) is an implicit function for optimal output that cannot be solved in closed 
form for an arbitrary price elasticity of demand. Conceptually, the net present value is 
the present value of market imperfections (or monopoly rents) arising from barriers to 
entry and is seen to be a function of shareholder diversification. In the Modigliani-Miller 
world, equation (9) represents the capitalized value of: (1) the differential of realized 
and required return, (2) the duration of the differential, and (3) the level of investment. 
This equation is thus a microeconomic equivalent of the Modigliani-Miller true growth 
model in a world of antidiversification.l 
A major concern in the field of Industrial Organization is an appropriate proxy for 
monopoly power. Frequently, seller concentration, size, or profitability is taken to be the 
measure of monopoly power. See Sullivan (1974), (1977), (1978), (1982) and Weiss 
(1974) for an elaboration. The more theoretical market value-to-book value ratio is 
another often examined measure of monopoly power (e.g. see Thomadakis 1977 and 
Sullivan 1974, 1977, 1978) and may be derived by dividing equation (8) by the book 
" lThe usual caveat of integrating a single-period model with a multi-period model applies. 
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value of assets, KQj (i.e., by KZ ), after solving for Sj. The market-to-book ratio, MBj, 
then is given by 
MBJ =I + [k(l+R)] f { z*2 + j+ KR)(6- 1)}. (11) 
The relationship between shareholder diversification, dj, and the NPV optimizing out- 
put, Z *, is worthy of examination even though equation ( 10) is not tractable. A drawing 
of the left-hand side (LHS) versus the right-hand side (RHS) of ( 10) for various values 
of f is presented in Figure 1 and clearly illustrates the relationship. The solution set 
where the LHS equals the RHS is given by the intersections, marked by circles, a smaller 
f (i.e., a larger dj), which signifies more shareholder diversification, increases the optimal 
output. 
The relationship between shareholder diversification and a firm's market-to-book ratio 
is somewhat clouded given that optimal output is itself a function of dj. Given Z*, 
however, a straightforward reading of equation ( 11 ) shows that a smaller f (i.e., a larger 
dj) which signifies more shareholder diversification, decreases the market-to-book ratio. 
An interesting question is what happens to a firm's market-to-book ratio under perfectly 
competitive pricing (i.e., ?7 goes to infinity). In the limit, equation ( 11) becomes (restoring 
Q116 for Z) 
MBi = 1 + K( I + R) {fjQ} (12) 
In the context of the standard CAPM, it is a well-known result that competitive pricing 
implies a market-to-book ratio (Tobin's Q) of one. Within the Mayshar framework, 
however, Tobin's Q is greater than one even under perfect competition. This result 
obtains because the pricing mechanism allows for unsystematic as well as systematic risk. 
Therefore, the extant literature that finds under perfect competition that Tobin's Q is 
one implicitly must assume perfect shareholder diversification (a result not consistent 
with the aforementioned surveys). It should be noted that the determination of all variables 
is generally simultaneous.12 Thus, for example, the reader should be careful in trying to 
go from equation 12 to the perfect diversification case because a substitution of dj equal 
to one in equation (I) results in variance not being priced. 
E(aj) - X cov* (aj,CFm) - 2 X J2. f Z* 
t 10 /^- 6~~~~(Vj + KR )Z*6 
/ Z* (Optmal Output) 
(f3 ' f2 ' f1l) 
FIGURE 1. The Relationship Between Shareholder Diversification and Optimal Output. 
12 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for making this point. 
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TABLE 2 
Regression Summary 
Industry Firms (N) Pdj,MBj 0 | a 
Aerospace 8 0.403 ~~~~~~1.202 0.014 Aerospace l  . 3 | (2.088) (1.078) 
Airlines 6 -0.826 (6563) | (-2.932) 
7.019 -0.823 
Appliances 4 -0.939 (5.322) (-3.860)* 
Automotive 14 -0.325 (4.1756) -0.009 
Banks 46 -0.420 
1.556 -0.009 Banks ~~~~~~~~~(10.022) (-3.067)* 
Beverages 8 0.461 1.479 
0.026 Beverages ~~~~~~~ ~ (1.712) (1.271) 
Building Materials 10 -0.047 1.5138 (-0.1033 
Chemicals 29 0.069 ~~~~~1.432 0.002 Chemicals | 29 .  (4.718) (0.362) 
2.400 -0.020 
Conglomerates 18 -0.525 (6.122) (-2.467)* 
Containers | 5 | -0.986 | 
2.662 -0.026 Containers ~~~~~~~~(21.895) (10.382)* 
Drugs ; 18 0 081 | 
2.624 0.006 Drugs  .  1 ~~~~~~~ ~ ~ (2.434) (0.324) 
Electronics 27 -0.248 2.826 (-1.216) 
Food Processing 33 -0.061 (2.472 -0.005 
Food & Lodging 12 -0.291 (3.573) (-0.964) 
General Machinery 10 -0.489 1774. (-12589)** 
Instruments 7 0.541 (1.078) (01441) 
Leisure Time 15 -0.310 ~~~3.301 -0.026 Leisure Time | - 3 10 (3.322) (-1.174) 
Metals 5 -0.406 ~~~~~~~1.605 -0.012 Metals  - .  ( 1.929) (-0.769) 
Misc. Manufacturing 40 -0.049 1.886 (-0.003 
1.037 0.008 Natural Resources 28 0.262(396(186* 
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TABLE 2 (cont'd) 
Industry Firms (N) Pad,Mfj a0 a 
Nonbank Financial 34 -0.238 2.855 -0.0 19 
(3.931) (-1.384)** 
Office Equipment 16 -0.122 2.4 (-0.461) 
Oil Service 15 0.138 (2756) (0.5053) 
Paper 24 -0.319 ~~~~~~~1.948 -0.012 Paper  - 0.319 1(5.757) ( 1.579)** 
Personal Care 7 -0.603 ~~~~4.076 -0.03 1 Personal Care r  | -0.603 (4.613) (?1.689)** 
Publishing 18 -0.177 4.357 (-0.718) 
Railroads 6 0.116 
0.992 0.002 
(2.012) (0.234) 
Real Estate 4 -0.056 (1.181) (-0.080) 
31.402 (-0.024) 
Retailing (Food) 17 -0.423 (6.173) (-01810)* 
Retailing (Non-Food) 46 -0.253 (5.321) -0.023 
Service 63 -0.181 ~~~~~~3.272 -0.019 Service T 3 .  (5.006) (- 1.439)** 
Special Machinery 10 -0.290 (2.583) -0.0858) 
2.360 -0.030 
Steel 8 -0.586 (3.267) (-1.770)** 
Textiles 16 -0.002 (2.558) (-0.009) 
Tires 6 -0.810 ~~~~~~~2.104 -0.021 Tires  - .  (5.265) (-2.762)* 
Tobacco 4 0.259 1.462 (0.379) 
Trucking 7 -0.244 ~~~~~~2.558 -0.009 Trucking  - .  (2.667) (-0.563) 
* Significant at 5% level (t-statistics in parentheses) 
** Significant at 10% level (t-statistics in parentheses) 
4. Empirical Analysis 
In this section we empirically examine the result that a firm's market-to-book ratio is 
negatively related to shareholder diversification. 
Our proxy for shareholder diversification, c4, is the aforementioned percentage of shares 
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held by institutional investors, a measure also used by Lakonishok and Shapiro ( 1986) 
in the same context. To hold constant the micro-effects, we examined 37 industries using 
1985 year-end data from Forbes January 13, 1986 for the following regression (regulated 
industries were eliminated because market-to-book ratios are constrained close to one) 13 
MBj = aeo + al dj + Ej where (13) 
MBj = the market price-to-book ratio, 
dj = proportion of outstanding shares held by institutional investors, 
ar0, a1 = intercept and slope estimates, respectively, and 
Ei = error term. 
The results are presented in Table 2. Of the 37 industries, 14 have statistically significant 
negative coefficients (8 at 5% and 6 at 10%) with only one significant coefficient being 
positive (at 10%). Thus, 14 of the 37 industries are consistent with the theoretical result 
which predicts a negative relationship between price-to-book ratio and shareholder di- 
versification. The statistically nonsignificant results (of the remaining 22 industries 14 
did have a negative sign) may, of course, result from many factors, such as, homogeneity 
within industry groups and small sample sizes. Future research might look at time series 
as well as other cross-sectional models. 
5. Conclusion 
The linkage between financial valuation and the product and factor markets faced by 
the firm is an area rapidly developing in the literature. Our purpose is to examine a firm's 
optimal output decision and valuation when its shareholders hold a limited number of 
risky assets. The primary theoretical result indicates that the market-to-book ratio is a 
function of the degree of shareholder diversification. Our theory suggests a negative re- 
lationship between a firm's market-to-book ratio and shareholder diversification. We 
suggest how management can ascertain the degree of its shareholders' diversification. 
Finally, our empirical results, while not conclusive, should inspire future research. 
13 We recognize that numerous studies have related market price-to-book value ratios to a wide variety of 
independent variables. We have avoided adding variables that may not have strong theoretical justification. 
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